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     This article, by using a unique dataset of a large number of Japanese firms, empirically 
investigates the relationship between the structure of shareholding and productivity, survival, 
and managerial objectives. The focus is on the distinct traits of family firms, which compose 
the majority of Japanese firms. 
         According to the results, the managerial objectives and performance of family firms are 
qualitatively and quantitatively different from those of non-family firms. Specifically, 1) 
productivity growth of family firms are significantly slower than non-family firms, after 
controlling for firm size, firm age, and industry; 2) family firms’ probability of survival is 
higher than that of non-family firms; and 3) even after controlling for the high propensity to 
survive, family firms’ productivity growth is slower. 
     As family firms’ management objectives are different from non-family firms, these 
results cannot be interpreted normatively. However, it is desirable to expand ownership options 
by reducing barriers to going public or transferring ownership. 
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1. Introduction 
 
     Productivity  growth  is  an  important  policy issue in advanced countries. In order to fully 
understand firm-level productivity differences and draw policy implications, it is essential to 
clarify what types of management and organization produce higher productivity. This article, 
by using a unique dataset of a large number of Japanese firms, empirically investigates the 
effects of the shareholding structure on firm productivity, growth, and survival. Special 
attention is paid to the differences between family firms, including owner-managed firms, and 
non-family firms. 
     Survey data on detailed firm characteristics and firm-level microdata from official 
statistics are matched and used in the analysis. The data contain information on the structure of 
shareholdings and the objectives of management. The sample exceeds 5,000 manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing firms including listed large firms and non-listed SMEs. 
     Family firms comprise a majority of Japanese firms as in other advanced economies. 
According to Ellul et al. (2007), from 30% to 40% of Fortune 500 and S&P 500 big companies 
are family owned. 1   Because owner-managed firms and family firms have intriguing 
implications for corporate governance, the effects of board or family ownership on firm 
performance have been vigorously investigated from the viewpoint of an agency problem (see, 
among others, Radice (1971), Palmer (1973), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck et al. (1988), 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), Anderson and Reeb (2003), Miller et al. (2007)). 
Family-controlled firms, where conflicts of interest between owners and managers are absent, 
may have positive effects on firm performance. On the other hand, the family shareholders, by 
using their power to extract private benefits, may harm firm performance.2 Therefore, 
empirical assessments are essential. 
     Most of the prior empirical studies use firm value – from the standpoint of accounting 
measure of profitability, Tobin’s q, or abnormal return – as a dependent variable.3 Some 
studies analyze the effects of family shareholdings on debt costs (Bargnani et al. (1994), Ellul 
et al. (2007)). In addition, several studies focus on firm growth or productivity. Lichtenberg 
and Pushner (1994), for example, by using Japanese manufacturing companies’ financial data 
from 1976 to 1989 analyze the effects of the shareholding structure on productivity. According 
to the results, board ownership, when the share is from 5% to 15%, has a positive effect on the 
                                                  
1  Bertrand and Schoar (2006) is an example of a recent survey on family firms. 
2 Villalonga and Amit (2006) named the first problem “Agency Problem I” and the second problem 
“Agency Problem II.” Morck et al. (2004) explain pros and cons of family firms. 
3 Fukuda et al. (2006) and Saito (2007) are recent examples of this type of analysis for Japanese firms 
by using Tobin’s q as a dependent variable.   - 3 -
total factor productivity (TFP) level.4  
     In this paper, I use measures of productivity (labor productivity and TFP) growth as 
dependent variables, because the interest here is not to test the agency theory, but to search for 
firm characteristics affecting productivity. At the same time, I analyze the probability of firm 
survival by probit estimation. 
     “Family firms” in this paper are defined as: 1) owner-managed firms and 2) firms at 
which board members and their family have large shareholdings. The distinctive features of 
this paper are 1) utilizing a large sample including SMEs, covering both manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing companies, 2) analyzing medium-term productivity growth, and 3) taking 
explicit account of firm exits. 
 
          The major results can be summarized as follows. 
1) In family firms, after controlling for firm size, firm age, and industry, the annual rate of 
labor productivity growth and TFP growth are around 2% slower than in non-family firms. 
2) On the other hand, family firms attach importance to firm survival as a managerial 
objective. In fact, the probability of survival for six years is around 10% higher than for 
non-family firms. 
3) Even after controlling for the high probability of survival, family firms’ productivity growth 
rate is still relatively lower. 
          The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I explain the data used for the 
analyses and the methods of estimation. Section 3 reports the results for growth, productivity, 





         The data used in this paper come from the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure 
and Activities (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) and the Survey of Corporate 
Management (Small and Medium Enterprise Agency). 
     The Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities, an annual survey 
started in 1991, uses representative statistics covering Japanese firms with 50 or more regular 
employees, including those engaged in mining, manufacturing, electricity and gas, wholesale, 
retail, and several service industries. The annual number of firms surveyed exceeds 25,000. In 
                                                  
4 Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) analyze US manufacturing companies and indicate that manager 
shareholdings have a positive effect on TFP. Barth et al. (2005), by using survey data on Norwegian 
companies, show that the TFP level is lower for family-owned firms at which the CEO is a family 
member.     - 4 -
recent years, the coverage has been expanded to various service industries. The purpose of the 
survey is to capture a comprehensive picture of Japanese firms including their basic financial 
information, composition of businesses, R&D activities, IT usage, and foreign direct 
investments. As the sample firms are coded by perpetual numbers, it is easy to construct a 
firm-level longitudinal data set. 
     On the other hand, the aim of the Survey of Corporate Management was to find facts 
about the structure and governance of Japanese firms. This survey investigates the managerial 
objectives, influential stake holders, structure of shareholders, internal organization, and so 
forth. The number of firms surveyed is 10,000 with more than 5,000 responding (the response 
rate was 51.5%).The survey was conducted in 1998 by using the registered list of the Basic 
Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities. Therefore, the two data can be merged 
by using the perpetual company numbers.5 
          This paper uses longitudinal data of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and 
Activities from 1998 to 2004. As a result, the relationship between firm characteristics in 1998 
and medium-term performance by 2004 can be analyzed. In this paper, 1) whether the firm is 
owner-managed or not and 2) shareholdings of board members and their family are used as 
major explanatory variables. 
     In  the  Survey  of  Corporate  Management,  an “owner” is defined as a founder, member of 
the founding group, a descendant of a founder, and those who have a blood relation with the 
founder family. An “owner-managed firm” is defined as a firm at which the owner is working 
as chief executive or chairperson or a firm of which the owner has substantial decision-making 
rights. If a firm fulfills this definition, a dummy for an owner-managed firm (ownerdum) is 
assigned. Concerning the shareholdings of board members and their family, the variables are 
categorical - 1) no shareholding, 2) under 5%, 3) 5% to under 10%, 4) 10% to under 20%, 5) 
20% to under 50%, and 6) 50% or over. I assign five dummies for each category and “no 
shareholding” is used as reference. For board ownership, a dummy board1 corresponds to 
under 5%, board2 correspond to 5% to under 10%, and so on. Family ownership dummies are 
assigned in a similar manner.
6  In addition to these dummies, firm size measured by log of the 
number of employees (lnemp_98), firm age (age_98), level of initial productivity (lntfp_98), 
and industry (ind_98) are used as control variables. Performance measures used as dependent 
variables (Δy) are, 1) sales growth (lndsale_9804), 2) growth of labor productivity 
(lnrvapp_9804), 3) growth of TFP (lntfpr_9804), and 4) survival/exit (surv_04).7 
                                                  
5 The number of matched companies in 1998 was around 4,500. In 2004, the number of surviving 
companies was around 3,500. 
6  Unfortunately, as the variables for board and family ownership are categorical, it is impossible to add 
simply to construct a single measure. 
7  TFP is calculated nonparametrically. The detail of the calculation is described in Morikawa (2007).   - 5 -
     As data on owner management and distribution of shareholdings are available only for 
1998, it is, unfortunately, impossible to analyze effects of the “changes” in ownership. In 
addition to simple OLS and probit estimations, I use Heckman’s two-step estimator to avoid 
possible attrition bias caused by exits. 
     In sum, I run simple regressions of the change in growth performances as indicated 
below. 
 
Δｙ= ß0 + ß1 lnemp + ß2 age＋ß3 productivity level＋ß4 ownership dummies 
  ＋ ßi industry dummies                       [ 1 ]  
 
Pr(surv_04=1) = F(ß0 + ß1 lnemp_98 + ß2 age_98 + ß3 lnkl_98 + ß4 rprofit_98 
    +   ß 5 ownership dummies + ßi industry dummies                    [ 2 ]  
 
For equation [1], ownership dummies are 1) ownerdum, 2) board1, board2, board3, 
board4, and board5, and 3) family1, family2, family3, family4, and family5. Firm size (lnemp), 
firm age (age), and industry dummies (3 digit) are ordinary controls. The initial productivity 
level (lnvapp_98, lntfp_98) is included for productivity growth equations to control for the 
convergence effect. In some estimation, a dummy for listed firms (listdum) is used as an 
additional explanatory variable. Interaction terms between ownership dummies with a dummy 
for listed firms are added when necessary. For equation [2], the dependent variable is the 
survival of a firm in 2004 (surv_04).8 As the high survival probability of larger and older 
firms is a stylized fact in this field, firm size (lnemp) and firm age (age) should be controlled. 
In addition capital intensity (lnkl), log of the value of tangible asset divided by the number of 
employees, initial profit rate on asset (rprofit), and industry dummies are included. A list of 




(1) Basic Findings about Family Firms 
     Among the approximately 5,000 sample firms, owner-managed firms compose 62.6%. 
The ratio is somewhat higher in non-manufacturing industries (Table 2). The distribution of 
board ownership and family ownership are indicated in Table 3. By firm size classes, the larger 
the firm size the lower is the ratio of owner-managed firms, but even for firms of over 1,000 
regular employees the ratio is 34.7% and for firms of over 5,000 regular employees the ratio is 
                                                  
8 Exactly speaking, nonexistence in 2004 does not necessarily mean that the firm shut down the 
business. Since the data do not cover firms at which the number of employees is below 50.   - 6 -
19.4%. As for board ownership, even for firms of over 1,000 employees, in 16.1% board 
members possess more than a 10% share. The owner-managed firms’ ratio of total sales is 
26.2% and the ratio of total employees is 36.5%. Although the figures are smaller than that of 
the number of firms, family firms represent from one-fourth to one-third of medium- to 
large-sized firms’ activities in Japan. 
     In comparing the sample mean of owner-managed firms’ and other firms’ sales growth, 
labor productivity, and TFP, owner-managed firms are inferior in all these measures to other 
firms (Table 4). The pictures are similar if we compare the performance measures by 
shareholding of board members and their family (Table 5). Family firms’ growth and 
productivity performance is, on average, lower. 
          As the information on ownership and composition of shareholdings are at the beginning 
of the time period, the possibility of reverse causality - low growth-performance determining 
firm ownership structure - is not a serious issue. 
 
 
(2) Growth and Productivity 
     The findings above are simple comparisons which do not control for the differences in 
firm size, firm age, industry, etc. This subsection reports results from the regression of 
equation [1]. Table 6 shows the results using the owner-manager dummy (ownerdum) as an 
independent variable. In order to avoid complexity, coefficients for the three-digit industry 
dummies are not reported here. After controlling for firm size, firm age, and industry, 
owner-managed firms’ growth in sales, labor productivity, and TFP are significantly lower. As 
the estimated coefficients are for six years from 1998 to 2004, owner-managed firms’ annual 
productivity growth rates are around 2% lower than for other firms.   
     When the dummy for listed firms (listdum) and the interaction term with the owner 
management dummy (listdum*ownerdum) are added, interesting results emerge (Table 7).9 
Although the coefficients for listdum are insignificant, the coefficients for the interaction term 
are positive and significant for all three estimations. The sizes of the coefficients are similar in 
magnitude with the negative coefficients of the ownerdum. The negative effects of owner 
manager are completely offset by going public. These results suggest that pressure from the 
capital market changes the nature of owner-managed firms. 
          Table 8 shows the regression results using board ownership (board1,  ・・・, board5) as an 
explanatory variable. When firms for which board shareholding is 10% or more, the sales 
growth rate is significantly low. When the board shareholding is 5% or more, labor 
productivity and TFP growth rates are significantly low. The larger the board shareholding, the 
                                                  
9  The number of listed firms in the sample is about 400.   - 7 -
lower monotonically is the productivity growth. To convert to an annual rate, productivity 
growth rates are around 3% lower for a firm whose board ownership is 50% or more. Table 9 
shows the results for family ownership (family1,  ・・・, family5). A larger shareholding by the 
family is detrimental to productivity growth. However, the relationship is non-monotonic; the 
productivity growth is the lowest when the family ownership ratio is from 20% to 50%. 
     When both board and family ownership are used simultaneously as independent 
variables the explanatory power of these variables decreases. The reason is simply because 
these two variables have positive correlation. However, both variables still have significantly 
negative effects on productivity when the shareholding ratios are 20% or above. The size of the 
coefficient is larger for board ownership than for family ownership (Table 10). 
 
 
(3) Probability of Survival 
     This subsection reports results for firm survival. According to the probit estimation 
(equation [2]), the probability of survival is significantly higher for owner-managed firms and 
firms at which shareholdings of board members and their family are high, after controlling for 
firm size, firm age, industry, and initial profit rate (Table 11). Evaluating by the marginal 
effects, owner-managed firms’ probability of survival is around 5% higher than other firms. 
When board ownership is 10% or more, the probability of survival is around 10% higher. The 
results are similar for family ownership. 
     As mentioned earlier, growth and productivity performance of family firms are lower, 
but the probability of survival is higher. These two results suggest that managerial objectives 
of family firms may different from non-family firms. The Survey of Corporate Management 
asks about firms’ most important objectives. The choices are 1) profit, 2) long-term growth, 
and 3) firm survival. Table 12 shows the results by firm type. The ratio of choosing survival as 
the most important objective is 43.2% for owner-managed firms, which is higher than other 
firms (35.9%). The results are similar for the shareholdings of board members and their family. 
Family firms seem to be risk-averse. According to the numerous empirical studies on firm 
growth and survival, the stylized facts are that survival rate is higher and growth rate is lower 
for large and aged firms. Learning and selection mechanisms are behind these facts.10 
Japanese family firms’ performance, on average, is not like that of entrepreneur firms but 
similar to that of large and aged firms. 
          When the dummy for listed firms (listdum) and its interaction term with the 
                                                  
10  Evans (1987) and Dunne et al. (1989) are representative analyses indicating that the failure rate and 
the growth rate decline with size and age. Caves (1998) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000) are 
representative surveys in this area.   - 8 -
owner-manager dummy are added in the probit estimation, the coefficient of listdum is 
negative and significant, but the coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant. Among 




          The results of the previous subsection raise some concerns that the estimation results for 
growth and productivity may involve an attrition bias. To address this possibility, this 
subsection checks the robustness of the results by explicitly taking into account survival/exit. 
The method is the simple Heckman’s two-step estimation. In the first stage probit estimation, 
firm size (lnemp), firm age (age), and initial profit rate (rprofit), all of these are usually thought 
to be important determinants for firm survival, and ownership dummies are used as 
explanatory variables. In the second stage OLS estimation, firm size, initial productivity level 
(lnvapp_98, lntfp_98), industry dummies, and ownership dummies are used. 
     The estimation results are presented in Table 13. Even after correcting for possible 
selection bias, signs and significances of the coefficients for ownership dummies are not 
affected. The effects of listing on growth and productivity are also unaffected (Table 14). As 
the set of dependent variables are different, the sizes of the coefficients are not directly 
comparable with simple OLS results. However, at least qualitatively, the results for growth and 
productivity are robust. 
     On the relationship between the composition of shareholders and firm performance, 
several studies pointed out possible reverse-causality - firm performance affecting ownership 
structure - and the possibility of the endogeneity of both variables (Jensen and Warner (1988), 
Loderer and Martin (1997), Cho (1998), and Himmelberg et al. (1999), among others). 
However, it is difficult to find an appropriate instrument which affects ownership structure but 
is independent of firm growth and productivity.11 The analyses in this paper are not 
cross-sectional regressions of a single year, but the relationships between initial firm 
characteristics and medium-term growth of sales or productivity. Consequently, the problem is 





     Family firms hold a large share in the Japanese economy. This paper, by using large, 
                                                  
11  Himmelberg et al. (1999) describe that “instrumental variables for managerial ownership are difficult 
to find.”   - 9 -
firm-level longitudinal data, investigates empirically the relationship between the composition 
of ownership and the performance of firms, with particular emphasis on family firms.   
          Major findings of the analysis can be summarized as follows. 
1) After controlling for basic firm characteristics such as firm size, firm age, and industry, 
family firms’ annual productivity growth rate is, on average, around 2% lower. 
2) Family firms view survival as an important managerial objective. In fact, the probability of 
survival for six years is, on average, around 10% higher than for non-family firms. Family 
firms seem to be risk-averse. 
3) Even after correcting for the high propensity to survive, the conclusion that family firms’ 
productivity growth is slower is still valid. 
 
     How should we draw implications from the results of family firms’ slow productivity 
growth and high survival probability? If productivity growth is the highest policy priority, 
family firms may seem undesirable.
12   As the share of family firms is larger in 
non-manufacturing industries, it is related to the issue of service-sector productivity in Japan. 
However, this is difficult to judge from a normative viewpoint, because family firms’ 
managerial objectives are different from those of non-family firms and their performance is in 
line with the objectives. Morck et al. (1988), who find negative effects of higher board 
ownership and founding family presence on firm value (Tobin’s q) in the U.S., argue that the 
results are “not evidence of inefficiency, since they might just reflect the optimal tradeoff 
between profits and private benefits.” Hence, from a policy perspective, it is important to 
expand options for family firms to change the structure by removing obstacles to going public 
or transfer of ownership to third parties. 
     This paper does not deal with reasons why family firms have different managerial 
objectives. Institutional factors, such as capital market imperfections and tax policies including 
inheritance tax and corporate tax, may be related. Clarifying these institutional factors is an 
important subject for future research. 
 
                                                  
12  Disney et al. (2003) is an example showing the importance of external restructuring－entry, exit and 
market share change－for productivity growth.   - 10 -
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sales Growth lndsale_9804 3,358 0.085 0.420 -2.780 3.488
Labor Productivity Growth lndvapp_9804 3,241 0.179 0.458 -2.875 3.258
TFP Growth lndtfp_9804 3,235 0.141 0.465 -2.908 3.904
Survival in 2004 surv_04 5,095 0.689 0.463 0 1
Log Regular employment lnemp_98 4,566 5.066 0.939 3.912 11.126
Firm Age age_98 4,566 38.5 15.4 0.0 106.0
Log Capital-Labor Ratio lnkl_98 4,561 1.798 1.132 -5.486 6.119
Profit Rate on Asset (1998) rprofit_98 4,566 0.017 0.065 -1.323 0.975
Labor Productivity (1998) lnvapp_98 4,556 -0.001 0.456 -3.063 3.008









Total 4,981 1,861 62.6%
Manufacturing 3,111 1,871 60.1%
Non-manufacturing 1,870 1,249 66.8%
(note) Industry classification is based on firm activities in 1998.  
 












Total 9.7% 17.3% 9.1% 11.6% 22.8% 29.5%
Manufacturing 10.7% 18.9% 8.1% 11.5% 21.5% 29.3%












Total 15.8% 15.7% 10.3% 14.5% 18.7% 25.1%
Manufacturing 17.1% 17.4% 10.2% 14.0% 17.2% 24.0%
Non-manufacturing 13.6% 12.9% 10.5% 15.3% 20.9% 26.9%
(note) Industry classification is based on firm activities in 1998.
(note) Industry classification is based on firm activities in 1998.
(1) Distribution of Board Ownership
(2) Distribution of Family Ownership
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Owner Managed Firms 0.053 0.126 0.088 0.012
Other Firms 0.139 0.269 0.230 0.015
t-value -5.744 -8.570 -8.364 -2.067
(note) Growth rates are from 1998 to 2004.   
 












no shareholding 0.193 0.247 0.192 -0.002 336
under 5% 0.100 -2.46 0.283 0.78 0.231 0.82 0.026 1.548 598
5% to under 10% 0.081 -2.59 0.190 -1.32 0.146 -0.96 0.019 0.812 316
10% to under 20% 0.038 -3.80 0.189 -1.33 0.139 -1.10 0.014 0.723 403
20% to under 50% 0.052 -4.16 0.132 -3.34 0.092 -2.69 0.014 1.020 789












no shareholding 0.157 0.233 0.180 0.007 516
under 5% 0.098 -1.89 0.249 0.40 0.202 0.57 0.019 0.782 513
5% to under 10% 0.049 -3.02 0.142 -2.29 0.098 -1.88 0.014 0.326 338
10% to under 20% 0.038 -3.88 0.143 -2.67 0.105 -2.06 0.012 0.232 475
20% to under 50% 0.040 -3.83 0.090 -4.22 0.049 -3.62 0.010 0.209 611
50% or over 0.042 -3.79 0.123 -3.52 0.091 -2.66 0.012 0.349 823
(note) Growth rates are from 1998 to 2004. t-values are based on comparisons with zero ownership firms.  
 
Table 6 Regression Results for Sales and Productivity Growth 
Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value
lnvapp_98 -0.3672 -20.37 0.000
lntfp_98 -0.4526 -23.93 0.000
lnemp_98 0.0003 0.04 0.971 0.0747 9.29 0.000 0.0685 8.75 0.000
age_98 -0.0030 -6.36 0.000 -0.0008 -1.64 0.101 -0.0018 -3.86 0.000
ownerdum -0.0382 -2.59 0.010 -0.1152 -7.72 0.000 -0.1307 -8.86 0.000
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Table 7 Regression Results Including Dummy for Listed Firm 
Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value
lnvapp_98 -0.3696 -20.36 0
lntfp_98 -0.4534 -23.94 0
lnemp_98 -0.0062 -0.68 0.494 0.0698 7.7 0 0.0674 7.58 0
age_98 -0.0030 -6.12 0 -0.0007 -1.52 0.13 -0.0017 -3.51 0
ownerdum -0.0506 -3.23 0.001 -0.1262 -7.99 0 -0.1431 -9.16 0
listdum -0.0118 -0.33 0.742 -0.0130 -0.36 0.716 -0.0398 -1.14 0.253
ownerdum*listdum 0.1341 2.85 0.004 0.1137 2.44 0.015 0.1184 2.58 0.01













Sales Growth Labor Productivity Growth
 
 
Table 8 Regression Results for Board Ownership 
Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value
lnvapp_98 -0.3800 -18.41 0.000
lntfp_98 -0.4594 -21.54 0.000
lnemp_98 -0.0002 -0.02 0.980 0.0655 6.79 0.000 0.0597 6.37 0.000
age_98 -0.0027 -4.79 0.000 -0.0002 -0.34 0.738 -0.0009 -1.48 0.139
board_1 -0.0234 -0.69 0.489 -0.0106 -0.29 0.769 -0.0345 -0.98 0.329
board_2 -0.0347 -0.93 0.354 -0.0987 -2.48 0.013 -0.1193 -3.04 0.002
board_3 -0.0703 -2.02 0.044 -0.0931 -2.50 0.012 -0.1123 -3.07 0.002
board_4 -0.0543 -1.71 0.088 -0.1265 -3.71 0.000 -0.1411 -4.20 0.000
board_5 -0.0737 -2.40 0.016 -0.1669 -5.08 0.000 -0.1778 -5.49 0.000

















Table 9 Regression Results for Family Ownership 
Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value
lnvapp_98 -0.3764 -17.36 0.000
lntfp_98 -0.4664 -20.55 0.000
lnemp_98 0.0053 0.61 0.545 0.0756 7.70 0.000 0.0735 7.67 0.000
age_98 -0.0023 -4.09 0.000 0.0004 0.67 0.502 -0.0001 -0.13 0.897
family_1 -0.0270 -0.98 0.327 -0.0342 -1.15 0.250 -0.0675 -2.30 0.021
family_2 -0.0499 -1.61 0.108 -0.0957 -2.80 0.005 -0.1019 -3.03 0.002
family_3 -0.0549 -1.96 0.050 -0.1079 -3.54 0.000 -0.1260 -4.19 0.000
family_4 -0.0555 -2.02 0.044 -0.1441 -4.79 0.000 -0.1582 -5.33 0.000
family_5 -0.0540 -2.06 0.039 -0.1162 -4.06 0.000 -0.1270 -4.49 0.000
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Table 10 Regression Results for Board and Family Ownership 
Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value
lnvapp_98 -0.3958 -17.33 0.000
lntfp_98 -0.4849 -20.41 0.000
lnemp_98 -0.0014 -0.15 0.882 0.0662 6.13 0.000 0.0656 6.23 0.000
age_98 -0.0026 -4.31 0.000 0.0000 0.03 0.974 -0.0006 -0.98 0.325
board_1 -0.0062 -0.16 0.877 -0.0105 -0.24 0.810 -0.0219 -0.51 0.610
board_2 -0.0175 -0.39 0.695 -0.0772 -1.58 0.113 -0.0851 -1.78 0.075
board_3 -0.0348 -0.82 0.411 -0.0560 -1.21 0.227 -0.0581 -1.28 0.202
board_4 -0.0443 -1.11 0.269 -0.1032 -2.35 0.019 -0.1102 -2.56 0.011
board_5 -0.0763 -1.94 0.053 -0.1593 -3.69 0.000 -0.1623 -3.83 0.000
family_1 -0.0095 -0.29 0.770 0.0075 0.21 0.831 -0.0223 -0.64 0.520
family_2 -0.0142 -0.39 0.700 -0.0158 -0.39 0.697 -0.0211 -0.53 0.595
family_3 -0.0209 -0.61 0.539 -0.0339 -0.91 0.362 -0.0497 -1.36 0.173
family_4 -0.0201 -0.60 0.551 -0.0622 -1.68 0.092 -0.0752 -2.08 0.038
family_5 -0.0567 -1.68 0.094 -0.0785 -2.10 0.036 -0.0959 -2.61 0.009

















Table 11 Probability of Survival 
(1) Owner-Managed Firms
Coef. dF/dx z-value P-value
lnemp_98 0.4257 13.0% 14.18 0.000
lnkl_98 0.0731 2.2% 3.60 0.000
age_98 0.0063 0.2% 4.02 0.000
rprofit_98 3.0377 92.8% 7.95 0.000





(note) Probit estimation results
(2) Board Ownership
 Coef. dF/dx z-value P-value
lnemp_98 0.4992 14.21% 13.02 0.000
lnkl_98 0.0627 1.79% 2.28 0.022
age_98 0.0030 0.08% 1.43 0.152
rprofit_98 2.7437 78.11% 5.50 0.000
board_1 0.1238 3.41% 1.10 0.272
board_2 0.1900 5.06% 1.52 0.128
board_3 0.4565 11.10% 3.86 0.000
board_4 0.4069 10.52% 3.88 0.000
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(3) Family Ownership
 Coef. dF/dx z-value P-value
lnemp_98 0.4807 13.74% 12.20 0.000
lnkl_98 0.0481 1.37% 1.71 0.088
age_98 0.0026 0.07% 1.21 0.225
rprofit_98 2.9006 82.92% 5.69 0.000
family_1 0.3284 8.52% 3.15 0.002
family_2 0.4281 10.50% 3.79 0.000
family_3 0.5124 12.44% 4.87 0.000
family_4 0.2744 7.28% 2.84 0.004

















Owner-Managed Firms 19.3% 37.5% 43.2% 3095





no shareholding 19.9% 44.1% 36.0% 331
under 5% 16.1% 51.4% 32.5% 591
5% to under 10% 15.3% 45.4% 39.3% 313
10% to under 20% 17.2% 37.6% 45.3% 402
20% to under 50% 20.1% 42.3% 37.7% 783
50% or over 19.2% 35.5% 45.3% 1,015





no shareholding 19.8% 45.2% 35.0% 511
under 5% 17.3% 49.2% 33.5% 508
5% to under 10% 18.8% 41.2% 40.0% 335
10% to under 20% 18.9% 38.0% 43.1% 471
20% to under 50% 21.3% 36.9% 41.8% 607
50% or over 17.3% 35.8% 46.9% 815
Total 18.8% 40.5% 40.7% 3,247 
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Table 13 Two-Step Estimation Results 
(1) Sales Growth
Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value
lnemp_98 0.0145 1.41 0.159 0.0243 2.26 0.024 0.0290 2.89 0.004
ownerdum -0.0302 -1.92 0.054
board_1 -0.0461 -1.38 0.167
board_2 -0.0468 -1.25 0.212
board_3 -0.0597 -1.67 0.096
board_4 -0.0465 -1.43 0.153
board_5 -0.0559 -1.75 0.081
family_1 -0.0139 -0.49 0.624
family_2 -0.0290 -0.90 0.367
family_3 -0.0243 -0.82 0.410
family_4 -0.0463 -1.65 0.099
family_5 -0.0451 -1.68 0.092
industry dummies
Number of obs
(2) Labor Productivity Growth
Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value
lnrapp_98 -0.3954 -21.51 0.000 -0.4098 -19.72 0.000 -0.4103 -18.99 0.000
lnemp_98 0.0381 4.22 0.000 0.0277 2.64 0.008 0.0407 3.96 0.000
ownerdum -0.1436 -9.21 0.000
board_1 -0.0298 -0.84 0.399
board_2 -0.1322 -3.34 0.001
board_3 -0.1510 -4.04 0.000
board_4 -0.1732 -5.11 0.000
board_5 -0.2188 -6.58 0.000
family_1 -0.0634 -2.09 0.036
family_2 -0.1258 -3.63 0.000
family_3 -0.1650 -5.26 0.000
family_4 -0.1674 -5.52 0.000




Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value
lntfp_98 -0.4452 -23.72 0.000 -0.4748 -22.78 0.000 -0.4827 -21.81 0.000
lnemp_98 0.0705 7.43 0.000 0.0171 1.64 0.102 0.0382 3.69 0.000
ownerdum -0.1298 -8.62 0.000
board_1 -0.0697 -2.00 0.045
board_2 -0.1661 -4.25 0.000
board_3 -0.1826 -4.95 0.000
board_4 -0.1999 -5.95 0.000
board_5 -0.2390 -7.26 0.000
family_1 -0.1029 -3.45 0.001
family_2 -0.1366 -4.01 0.000
family_3 -0.1838 -5.91 0.000
family_4 -0.1861 -6.23 0.000





(note) Regression results of the second step of Heckman's two step. Explanatory variables of the selection model are lnemp_98, lnkl_98,
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Table 14 Two-Step Estimation Including Dummy for Listed Firms 
Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value Coef. t-value P-value
lnvapp_98 -0.3973 -21.48 0.000
lntfp_98 -0.4459 -23.76 0.000
lnemp_98 0.0113 0.98 0.329 0.0341 3.34 0.001 0.0724 6.92 0.000
ownerdum -0.0478 -2.86 0.004 -0.1552 -9.55 0.000 -0.1448 -9.16 0.000
listdum -0.0522 -1.48 0.139 -0.0209 -0.60 0.549 -0.0654 -1.95 0.052
ownerdum*listdum 0.1682 3.59 0.000 0.1243 2.67 0.008 0.1391 3.10 0.002
_cons -0.4822 -1.26 0.209 0.3634 0.98 0.326 -0.0802 -0.22 0.828
industry dummies
Number of obs
(note) Regression results of the second step of Heckman's two step. Explanatory variables of the selection model are lnemp_98, lnkl_98,
age_98, rprofit_98, and ownerdum.
4466 4466 4466
yes yes yes
Sales Growth Labor Productivity Growth TFP Growth
 
 